

# MR Review Essay

## Another Such Victory

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Harry S. Truman, often called the “accidental president,” assumed his duties as commander-in-chief on 12 April 1945 shortly after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Many modern-day presidents, and several prominent historians, refer to Truman’s brusque personality and his “give ‘em hell” attitude as worthy of emulation in the conduct of foreign affairs and national defense.

Arnold A. Offner’s book *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953* (California, Stanford University Press, 2002) presents a new interpretation of Truman’s Cold War presidency that questions his leadership abilities and job performance. Using recently declassified documents from American, Russian, Korean, and other international government archives, Offner paints a picture of Truman as “parochial and simplistic, showing little ability to comprehend the basis for other nations’ policies, and demonizing the leaders of other nations who would not bend to the will of the United States.”

Offner examines Truman’s background and his entry into politics under the tutelage of “Boss” Tom Pendergast, the leader of Missouri democratic politics for decades. According to Offner, Truman emulated his father’s hard-work ethic and often distanced himself from his peers. Thus, when entering the political arena for the first time under Pendergast, Truman demonstrated a penchant for “deferring to stronger leaders such as Pendergast or to Secretaries of State George C. Marshall or Dean Acheson, whose manner and firm views he found reassuring.”

Offner provides a good assessment of Truman’s World War I military career. While serving in France

with the 129th Field Artillery, 35th Division, Truman was initially “elected” to first lieutenant and eventually rose to the rank of major. He had the respect of his troops and always held that his “whole political career was based on his war service and army associates.” Offner qualifies these remarks by informing the reader of Truman’s racist epithets that popped up from time to time during his private conversations.

Offner also criticizes Truman’s self-deprecating style and mannerisms. Soon after taking office, Truman frequently asked those with whom he met to pray for him. Senator Alben Barkley and assistant presidential press secretary Elben Ayers warned Truman that such comments were “eroding his executive authority.”

Truman’s sheltered vice presidency during the last months of Roosevelt’s life eventually handicapped Truman in assuming the role of president. Offner tells his readers: “Truman did not grasp the difference between Cabinet officers—powerful figures with large constituencies, and staffers whose sole function was to serve the president.” He was clearly insecure in his position and was “excessive[ly] suspicious about government officials and private spokespeople who eventually narrow[ed] the range of views or policy options to be placed before him.”

Truman was operating well beyond his abilities, which is evident during deliberations among his cabinetmembers regarding the use of atomic power and the idea of sharing industrial and scientific information with the Soviet Union. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) “insisted that urban-industrial America was highly

vulnerable to atomic attack and opposed any accord that would give the other nation, especially the Soviets, access to atomic weapon information.”

Offner gives Truman passing marks for his work in the Middle East, particularly for his work associated with establishing a Jewish homeland. According to Offner, “The president’s actions in this matter were governed by his sense of moral and political commitment, by the advice offered by shrewd White House advisers, and by the fact that the Jews in Palestine were able to seize the moment.”

Perhaps no other controversy in U.S. history has the fireworks associated with it than the conflict between Truman and General Douglas MacArthur. Truman often referred to MacArthur as “Mr. Prima Donna,” “Brass Hat,” “Five-Star MacArthur,” “a supreme egotist who regarded himself as a god.”

In July 1950, the JCS recommended MacArthur, who was nearing 70, as their sole choice for the newly created position of United Nations Commander. Offner relates the story of what happened between MacArthur and Truman at the time Truman was to give a nationwide address on his Far East policy, copies of which had been sent to MacArthur for his comments. MacArthur’s comments arrived with only 15 minutes to spare, which caused Truman to fume.

The rivalry continued and MacArthur was recalled to the United States (relieved of duty) in April 1951. Offner tells of Acheson’s wanting to build some consensus before firing MacArthur to deflect the oncoming political attacks that Truman would undoubtedly receive.

General Omar Bradley wanted to consult the JCS, but he did not have the opportunity to do so. Truman's response was predictable: "MacArthur was a worse double crosser than [General George B.] McClellan," re-

ferring to the unprofessional conduct of McClellan and his stormy relationship with President Abraham Lincoln. Truman added, "There cannot be two policy makers at the head of government."

Offner's book about Truman is provocative and thoroughly researched. He provides detailed notes, an outstanding bibliography, and superb illustrations that highlight Truman's life and presidency. **MR**

## The Wound and the Dream

Major Jeffrey C. Alfier

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*The fate the world has given me is to struggle to write powerfully enough to draw others into the horror*—Bruce Weigl, *The Circle of Hanh* (Grove Press, New York, 2000).

With the publication of *The Wound and the Dream: Sixty Years of American Poetry about the Spanish Civil War* (University of Illinois Press, Champaign, 2002), English professor and cultural historian Cary Nelson presents a meticulous, compelling anthology of poetry that underscores the fascination that the antifascist cause of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) has long held for American poets.

When the Spanish Civil War ended, two groups of poets returned to the undying theme of Spain—Spanish exiles and Americans. Throughout this anthology, Nelson gives readers a sense of "the collective and almost choral nature" of the war's poetry, as well as its "lyrical and rhetorical invention" that gives it its most moving and persuasive expression. Moreover, as he reminds us, the poetry of this war was read on the streets and in the trenches.

Like poems of any tragedy, the best are not the ones gloriously trumpeting broad causes or agendas, instead they are those that reveal poignant particulars of individual lives. For example, in allusion to Clio—the first Muse—and the inevitability of wartime death, James Rorty writes,

*Life takes its final meaning  
From chosen death; this stirrup-  
cup  
History, the ancient, greedy  
bitch.*

Describing the lives of children crippled by bombing from Franco's

aircraft, Leslie Ullman speaks to the way—

*Someone dressed them  
in lace and gabardine, like  
the antique figures. . . .  
Their deaths seemed to rise  
inside them  
like the sleep of the newly-born.*

Yet, in many of the poems, polemic slogans interspersed in the lines disturb the continuity of the verse. Norman Rosten inserts:

*MADRID! TOMB! FASCISM!*

amid the lines of his poem, *The March*. However, the war's contemporaneous poets could not afford the literary luxury of distance from their subject; theirs was a moral urgency.

There is little to criticize in this enlightening book. Although one criticism might be that Nelson goes a bit far when he asserts that the United States willfully forgot the meaning of the Spanish Civil War. Another criticism is Nelson's lack of a more complete index, and perhaps

the dates when the poets wrote the poems should have been included with the poems themselves, not in the content pages.

These light criticisms aside, Nelson's anthology is a welcome addition to the growing body of poetry resurrected from under the avalanche of high modernism. The book is an excellent companion to earlier anthologies such as *The Penguin Book of Spanish Civil War Verse* by Valentine Cunningham (Penguin Books, New York, 1980), and *Poetry of the Spanish Civil War* by Marilyn Rosenthal (New York University, New York, 1975).

Although many question the motives of the Stalinists and the Iberian Left that composed so much of the antifascist forces, the poetry of the Spanish Civil War—as Nelson conclusively shows—"was one of the indisputable terms in which history burnt its name into the living flesh of its time." Nelson's collection of poems will certainly make historians and poets appreciative of this era. **MR**

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# MR Book Reviews

**THE FALLACIES OF COLD WAR DETERRENCE AND A NEW DIRECTION**, Keith B. Payne, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2001, 225 pages, \$19.95.

Keith B. Payne's book, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction*, argues that the U.S. approach to deterrence is based on flawed assumptions and that it creates a dangerous overconfidence and complacency among policy-makers. Cold War deterrence policy was based on the premise that the Soviet Union would behave in accordance with what the United States perceived as rational. Today, the Cold War framework for deterrence remains unchanged despite the dramatic changes to the international context. Payne exposes the flaws within that framework and offers a more comprehensive and empirical methodology for formulating U.S. deterrence postures.

Payne deconstructs the U.S. faith in Cold War nuclear deterrence and reveals the chilling facts of Soviet war plans that diverged from U.S. expectations. Despite this, the U.S. approach to deterrence in the post-Cold War era continues to rely on the same invalid assumptions of rationality. Policymakers apply this framework indiscriminately to every potential threat regardless of specific contextual considerations. Payne's alternative is to develop a tailored model for every disparate opponent. His approach would be based on developing a thorough understanding of each potential challenger and the factors that influence the decision-making process. He applies his methodology to a Sino-American conflict scenario precipitated by a crisis over Taiwan.

Payne presents a compelling argument for adopting a new approach in deterrence. While deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction remains a fundamental U.S. strategic objective, Payne offers new ways and new applications of means to

achieve those ends. As president of the National Institute for Public Policy, and author of several books on strategic topics, Payne is an experienced strategy and policy analyst. His book is topical and timely as public debate on National Missile Defense continues and as the United States considers how to adapt strategically to an array of threats including global terrorism.

MAJ Joel A. Woodward, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE: Strategic Considerations**, James M. Smith, ed., USAF Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, CO, February 2001, 166 pages, price unavailable.

*Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: Strategic Considerations*, a collection of four papers on post-Cold War deterrence and strategic defense; nuclear strategy; and regional considerations, is far from exhaustive of all of the dimensions that should come under review. The essayists raise valuable questions and make recommendations. The first paper, "Triad 2025: The Evolution of a New Strategic Force Posture," is a thesis on the reformulation of what constitutes effective deterrence in today's evolving strategic environment. The authors present and develop an argument for a strategic U.S. nuclear deterrence concept to replace the traditional land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) concept. The authors argue that the old ICBM concept was based on punishment, offense, and offensive parity. Their construct embraces both punishment and denial, adding defense to the mix and a multilateral dimension to the determination of effectiveness. Much of their argument is on emerging strategic threats, and it raises several issues about potential complications and strategic considerations.

The other three papers specifically address threats, issues, and

complications involved with Russia, China, and the positions of European allies on a national missile defense concept. For example, "Shrimp or Barracuda? Contemplating a Unified and Nuclear Capable Korea," forecasts "an accelerated soft landing" for Korean unification on negotiated terms between 2015 and 2020. The authors hypothesize that Korea might opt for retaining an independent nuclear capability to ensure national security, present a detailed examination of the implications of such a decision—whether declared or covert—on regional actors and the United States, including special emphasis on the receptivity of theater missile defenses (TMD) or nuclear missile defenses (NMD).

"Implications of Ballistic Missile Defenses for the Security and Stability of Northeast Asia" examines some of the same issues the second paper addresses. However, the essayist's perspective centers directly on regional interest of U.S. TMD and NMD deployment. The conclusion is that a U.S. TMD deployment could well spur China to develop more missile systems.

"The European Union and a Nuclear Security and Defense Policy" examines historic and contemporary pressures and decisions revolving around a European concept of defense divorced from reliance on U.S. conventional or nuclear partnerships. The authors conclude that an independent European nuclear course is unlikely, but a U.S. push for NMD could potentially change that course. As with the two previous papers, the authors recommend a policy of discussion, inclusion, and cooperation in strategic matters of unilateral U.S. action.

It is worth emphasizing that missile defense is only one tool among many in maintaining peace, security, and stability and must be considered within the context of the entire strategic framework, which includes of-

fensive nuclear arms as well as broader diplomatic and security activities such as arms control and nonproliferation efforts. This diversified approach to deterrence is appropriate for the complex, less-predictable world in which we live.

**MAJ Larry Small, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**AT HITLER'S SIDE: The Memoirs of Hitler's Luftwaffe Adjutant, 1937-1945**, Nicolaus von Below, translated by Geoffrey Brooks, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, (1980) 2001, 256 pages, \$29.95.

Three decades after the end of the World War II, Nicolaus von Below recounted his professional career as German Frueher Adolf Hitler's Luftwaffe Aide from 1937 to 1945. *At Hitler's Side: The Memoirs of Hitler's Luftwaffe Adjutant, 1937-1945*, originally published in 1980, is here translated into English for the first time. Although most of Von Below's original notes and diaries were destroyed at the end of the war, his recollections are fascinating and interesting to study.

At the time of his original writing, Von Below maintained a high regard for Hitler. While not entirely apologetic for Hitler's actions, he definitely focused his thoughts and recollections on Hitler's less problematic aspects. Initially, Von Below emphasizes Hitler's "sharp logic and extraordinary fine feel for military situations" and his desire to maintain peace. According to Von Below's account, Britain drove Europe to conflict in the immediate prewar years, countering or invalidating Hitler's initiatives to prevent a European conflagration.

Hitler's failings toward the end of the war were not the result of personal faults but, rather, stemmed from his unbearable feeling of abandonment and betrayal after the 20 July 1944 assassination attempt. Von Below glosses over and seldom mentions German atrocities and Hitler's attitudes toward the Jews. In one short section, he denies all knowledge of the deportation and destruction associated with the "final solution." In contrast, entire sections of the book are dedicated to allied "atrocities," such as the Katyn Forest massacre, the attack on Monte

Cassino ("pure vandalism" in Von Below's words), and the Dresden bombing.

This intriguing book should appeal to a wide audience. It certainly presents a different side of World War II German leadership than is generally accepted. True, the reader should take many of Von Below's assertions and commentary with a grain of salt, but regardless of the reader's agreement or disagreement with Von Below's perspective, *At Hitler's Side* is provocative and will definitely spur research and examination.

**MAJ Michael A. Boden, USA,  
Hohenfels, Germany**

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**AN UNCERTAIN TRUMPET: The Evolution of U.S. Army Infantry Doctrine, 1919-1941**, Kenneth Finlayson, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2001, 178 pages, \$62.50.

Everyone concerned with the direction of current Army Transformation should read Kenneth Finlayson's small book *An Uncertain Trumpet: The Evolution of U.S. Army Infantry Doctrine, 1919-1941*. Finlayson, a historian with the Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, masterfully assesses the evolution of small unit infantry doctrine from World War I through the United States' initial entry into World War II. His discussion of the varying influences of senior officers, who frequently pushed agendas harmful to the fighting effectiveness of the infantry army, and his analysis of the glacial pace of weapons acceptance should serve as cautionary notes for current Transformation efforts. Finlayson's comprehensive grasp of source documents, his understanding of the doctrine-development process, and his clear and engaging writing style make his study of doctrinal change a compelling, fascinating book.

A small disappointment with the book is that its analysis ends with the U.S. entry into World War II. Finlayson implies that infantry doctrine held some responsibility for the early battlefield defeats in North Africa. However, his analysis does not extend to any discussion of those battles or the influence of doctrine on how the U.S. Army actually fought

World War II. Despite this, the book is a superb addition to the story of the U.S. Army in the interwar years.

One might read this book along with William O. Odom's discussion of operations doctrine in *After the Trenches: A Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939* (Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 1999) and David E. Johnson's assessment of weapons and doctrine development in *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army 1917-1945* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1998). *Uncertain Trumpet* provides a comprehensive, and possibly prophetic, look at current efforts to maintain the Army's strategic relevance. I highly recommend this book.

**Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.,  
Lansing, Kansas**

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**THE FRAGMENTATION OF AFGHANISTAN: State Formation and the Collapse of the International System**, Barnett R. Rubin, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2002, 420 pages, \$35.00.

*The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and the Collapse of the International System* remains the best single source for understanding the collapse of social order, discipline, mores, and structure in that war-torn state. Barnett R. Rubin, perhaps the West's leading non-Afghan authority on Afghanistan, first published this landmark study in 1995. The book's prophetic last sentence states, "If the international community does not find a way to rebuild Afghanistan, a floodtide of weapons, cash, and contraband will escape that state's porous borders and make the world less secure for all." Unfortunately, that prediction came true. Following the events of 11 September 2001, the world's attention finally fixed on Afghanistan. The book is belatedly receiving the attention it deserves.

An excellent account of the history of Afghanistan, Rubin's book emphasizes the period of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) and afterward. When the Soviet Union withdrew from the region and collapsed, the United States also disengaged from the region. Afghanistan had fought a war with a superpower, lost

well over a million citizens, and was left without a legitimate state and national leadership. Its best and brightest citizenry was scattered across the globe. The economy was shattered, and a country that had once exported food could no longer feed itself. What Afghanistan had in abundance was warlords, disease, and poverty.

The United States and other former ardent supporters of the Mujahideen provided charity relief but political neglect. In this failed state, the Taliban movement found ready followers. The Taliban began as a movement to bring peace, disarm warlords, and unite the Pushtun peoples. It eventually ended anarchy but produced a rogue state locked in a brutal, ethnic civil war with the Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara peoples.

The Taliban proved to be a fundamentalist, oppressive regime, which sponsored smuggling and narcotics traffic and welcomed the financial support of regional states and organizations, including international terrorists organizations such as al-Qaeda. Soon Al-Qaeda set up training camps and headquarters in Afghanistan and fielded units alongside the Taliban force. The devastation of Afghanistan allowed outlaws and terrorists a safe haven from which to launch global suffering.

The repercussions of events in Afghanistan echo throughout Iran, Central Asia, and South Asia. Until stability comes to this entire region, the threat to international stability remains. Rubin's book provides an excellent indepth background to the country, which will remain a concern for the United States for many years to come. Military professionals will find Rubin's book indispensable in understanding the political and social realities of contemporary Afghanistan.

LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired,  
Leavenworth, Kansas

**THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, 1946-1989**, Joseph Trento, Prima Publishing, Roseville, CA, 2001, 432 pages, \$30.00.

Joseph J. Trento's *The Secret History of the CIA, 1946-1989*, attempts to expose alleged ineptitudes and wrongdoing in the CIA. Unfortun-

nately, the book promises much more than it delivers. Also, it makes no direct reference to terrorists attacks, dealing almost entirely with the period from the CIA's founding in 1947 to the 1980s. In fact, the term "terrorism" is absent from the index.

For a supposedly secretive organization, the CIA attracts a great deal of attention. Over the years it has been accused of everything from gross ineptitude and massive corruption to scheming for world domination. The most consistent strain of criticism, however, has been the charge that the CIA is the victim of its own alleged arrogance and ineptitude. This sort of criticism is so common that the CIA's bibliographic website has a special category for accusations, subdivided by time periods. Some criticism is rooted in fact, but much of it has strong elements of fantasy. The arguments appeal chiefly to conspiracy buffs and consist mostly of speculation, hearsay, and circumstantial evidence.

Trento coauthored *Widows: Four American Spies, the Wives They Left Behind, and the KGB'S Crippling of American Intelligence* (Crown Publishers Inc., New York, 1989), with Susan Trento and William Corson. They argue that U.S. intelligence in general and the CIA in particular were no more than playthings in the hands of the Soviet Union's Secret Police and intelligence agency. Trento carries on the same theme in *Secret History*. Once again he presents the thesis that since its inception, the CIA has been a colossal failure, outmaneuvered by its enemies, penetrated by the KGB, and duped at every turn.

Some of the evidence that Trento presents is undoubtedly true, but except for details, none of it is new or startling. For example, the attempt to enlist organized crime in a campaign to assassinate Fidel Castro is well known. One of Trento's few current "revelations" is that President William Clinton used a presidential pardon to save CIA Director John Deutch from a possible jail term.

The centerpiece of Trento's book is a 1985 interview with the legendary former CIA Chief of Counterintelligence James Angleton. As might be

expected, the interview offers little new about Angleton or his work as a counterspy. However, in a series of extensive quotes from Angleton, it provides the clearest and most succinct statement of the book's theme. Disgraced and dying of cancer, the counterspy reportedly said, "I realize now that I have wasted my existence, my professional life. . . . There was no accountability and without accountability everything turned to shit. . . . Fundamentally, the founders of U.S. intelligence [the CIA] were liars. The better you lied and the more you betrayed, the more likely you would be promoted. These people attracted and promoted each other. Outside of their duplicity, the only thing they had in common was a desire for absolute power. . . . [Y]ou had to believe [they] would deservedly end up in hell."

The best that can be said of this book is that it avoids accusing the CIA of actively seeking world domination. For those interested in the CIA and the practice of intelligence, there are many superior books on the subject.

LTC Thomas K. Adams, USA,  
Springfield, Virginia

**ON WAR AND LEADERSHIP: The Words of Combat Commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf**, Owen Connelly, Princeton University Press, NJ, 2002, 347 pages, \$29.95.

In *On War and Leadership: The Words of Combat Commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf*, Owen Connelly captures the words of 20 combat commanders and military leaders from the past 250 years, from Frederick the Great and Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein and 1st Viscount William Joseph Slim to Lieutenant General Harold Moore and General Norman Schwarzkopf. The book is an excellent anthology of the thoughts and leadership philosophy of 20 "muddy boots leaders" in recent history. Connelly focuses on the common beliefs these men held in terms of leadership and warfighting. The common threads he stresses are the necessity of personal and up-front leadership; taking care of and

understanding soldiers; and the value of improvisation on the battlefield.

Although Connelly uncovers no new or previously unpublished thoughts from these leaders (most are from previously published memoirs and biographies), he does package their views well. Each chapter begins with a synopsis of the man's career and ends with a brief, but well crafted, analysis of the leader.

Connelly has obviously structured this anthology for a diverse audience, and although I feel the book is aimed at civilian leaders (many who might not have studied these leaders), it does have usefulness for military readers. The book is a good place to find material needed for instruction or professional development; the reader can simply thumb through a chapter and pick up validating points or points of discussion for use. The book also raises some thought-provoking questions. "What did this diverse group of leaders have in common?" "What leadership qualities will always remain constant?" "What leaders would I have chosen to capture 'upfront leadership'?" Owen Connelly's book would be an excellent addition to any library.

LTC Rick Baillergeon, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**CIVIL WAR ARTILLERY AT GETTYSBURG: Organization, Equipment, Ammunition, and Tactics**, Philip M. Cole, DaCapo Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, 320 pages, \$35.00.

Although slightly repetitive, awkwardly written, and probably mistitled, Philip M. Cole's much-needed book of 19th-century artillery is ostensibly about artillery at Gettysburg. However, only about 25 pages are actually devoted to the battle; Cole examines the artillery arm for the entire Civil War. Rather than being a dull treatise, *Artillery at Gettysburg: Organization, Equipment, Ammunition, and Tactics* proves to be an engaging book. Cole describes the development, procurement, and organization of each army's artillery branch, noting similarities and differences.

Cole explains the benefits and liabilities of each piece of artillery

used during the Civil War and describes the variety of rifled guns, from cast iron to bronze, as well as a variety of rifled guns including the 2.9-inch Parrot and the exotic Whitworth breechloading rifles used by the Confederacy. Complementing the discussion of the actual cannon, Cole includes chapters on logistics, training, various types of ammunition, and the support structure. His use of photographs, diagrams, and maps are excellent and integrate seamlessly into the text.

One of the most important segments of the book is the organization of the artillery for the both armies. Although each army had a chief of artillery (Confederate General William Pendleton and Union General Henry Hunt), the opposing forces organized their artillery in subtle but different ways. While each army had an artillery reserve, the Confederate Army parceled out its reserve into three infantry corps, which made communication and concentration difficult. The Union Army concentrated its reserve in one solid mass. Hunt was nominally in command of all artillery at Gettysburg even though each corps had its own allocation of batteries. This difference allowed Hunt to rapidly shift batteries around the battlefield to threatened areas.

Hunt wanted to conserve ammunition until General Robert E. Lee began his charge, then devastate the enemy as it crossed the killing ground. Second Corps commander General Winfield Hancock wanted his artillery to respond to Lee's cannonade to keep up the morale of his troops. Hunt was thinking of effectiveness and killing power while Hancock was thinking of morale.

The book has a few minor weaknesses. Cole spends too much time discussing the British Whitworth guns. The Confederates had only two Whitworth guns on the battlefield, and their effectiveness was negligible. Also, Cole's analysis focuses more on the technology, organization, and support of the artillery and less on the actual performance of the artillery during the battle. Despite such flaws, the book is interesting and informative. Not only does it

explain why events unfolded the way they did, it helps explain how they unfolded.

MAJ James Gates, USAF,  
Lake Ridge, Virginia

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**THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE**, Samuel B. Griffith II, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, (1976), 2002, 725 pages, \$55.00.

*The War for American Independence* is a reissue of a 1976 book that is well worth a new look. While other classics, such as Robert Middlekauff's *The Glorious Cause: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789* (MacMillan & Co., Ltd., UK, 1971) and Don Higginbotham's *The War of American Independence* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1982), are still the best treatments of the American Revolution, Samuel B. Griffith's study is solid scholarship and a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject.

*The War for American Independence* is a straightforward chronological narrative with a focus on the political and military aspects of the American Revolution. Griffith does not attempt to present a dominant thesis; instead he provides analyses of several key issues as they appear.

Because Griffith writes extensively about the British side of the struggle, many of his insights focus on British errors. For example, he is critical of the British Government's inability to grasp the political realities of America, and he provides an excellent appraisal of the shortcomings in British strategy during the Saratoga Campaign. Still, Griffith maintains balance in his assessments of both sides and provides praise and criticism.

Griffith's detailed look at the British Government's internal conflicts during the American Revolution describes the events leading to the war. The first three chapters contain extensive, useful descriptions of the British parties, their leaders' personalities, and the shifting governmental policies toward the Colonies. Griffith also includes excellent material on the diplomatic aspects of the struggle in other European courts.

Griffith's familiarity with military

subjects enables him to make insightful critiques of campaign strategies. In addition to his superb analysis of the Saratoga Campaign, he examines other crucial campaigns with a perceptive eye toward tactical and strategic realities. He is properly critical of George Washington's Long Island strategy and the subsequent British inactivity after their victory—a reflection of the hesitation shown by King George's commanders in Boston after Concord, Lexington, and Bunker Hill. Griffith is willing to find flaws and distribute praise in proper doses, but he does it with a sympathetic understanding of the difficulties faced by leaders on both sides.

The book contains few errors. However, the abrupt ending to the book is disappointing. Griffith ends the narrative with the events that occurred at Yorktown without any explanation of the final diplomatic ending of the war. Given Griffith's superb rendering of the British political side leading to the war, one wishes that he had devoted the same effort to the political activity after Yorktown, which ultimately led to the treaty of Paris. Despite the sudden ending, the book—a valuable contribution to the history of the American Revolution—is well written, fair, and provides great insights.

Curtis S. King, Ph.D.,  
Leavenworth, Kansas

**PANZERKRIEG: The Rise and Fall of Hitler's Tank Divisions**, Peter McCarthy and Mike Syron, Carroll & Graf Publishers, NY, 2002, 307 pages, \$26.00.

The title of this book, *Panzerkrieg: The Rise and Fall of Hitler's Tank Divisions*, brings to mind an epic study tracing the fortunes of Germany's armored forces during World War II. Unfortunately, the final product falls short of such expectations.

Although authors Peter McCarthy and Mike Syron demonstrate youthful exuberance in this endeavor, their efforts never go beyond surface discussion of any key issues or events; it is a study of German armored forces before and during World War II. McCarthy and Syron lay a solid

foundation and devote effort to describing the war's progress, the role of panzertruppen, and parallel technological developments. The book contains appropriate appendixes, which document the evolutionary improvement of tank formations, and excellent photographs, and maps that adequately depict the war.

*Panzerkrieg* is not a scholarly work, and anyone familiar with World War II and the application of armor will find nothing new here. Too often the authors' narration becomes merely a general history of the war, told at levels above brigade. The authors include a skimpy bibliography, focusing only on the best known of secondary and primary sources, and provide documentation only to direct quotes.

The authors appear biased toward the Wehrmacht and certain leaders within its hierarchy. The reader is constantly reminded of the genius of Hermann Balck, Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, and Erich von Manstein, while Fedor von Bock, Erich von Kleist, and Adolf Hitler can do little right. Heinz von Guderian, of course, appears as the sole savior of the German panzertruppen. While merits exist for these characterizations, McCarthy and Syron provide little analysis about how they arrived at their conclusions. Devoting little energy to the discussion of doctrine, they address most of the significant German wartime technological developments, but they only indirectly consider how German tank divisions, brigades, and groups applied these advances.

The book's positive aspects are that the authors properly balance the war's progression and German technical improvements; the latter of

which occur at advantageous points in the narrative. Notwithstanding the lack of analysis, documentation, or unique theses, the information McCarthy and Syron provide is quite accurate.

The fact that this book is so easy to read might prove problematic to the scholar. For someone who is familiar with the subject or someone who wants to conduct serious research, this book provides little useful insight. *Panzerkrieg* is a well-meaning effort, but falls short on serious scholarship.

MAJ Michael A. Boden, USA,  
Hohenfels, Germany

**DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY FORCE**, Philip P. Everts, Palgrave, NY, 2002, 256 pages, \$68.00.

Peoples of democracies, regardless of cost, will inevitably support wars of survival. Whether the democracy will support a sustained war is another issue. Philip P. Everts, Director of the Institute for International Studies at Leiden University, the Netherlands, provides evidence from European and American public opinion surveys to prove that populations are fickle when casualties are suffered in operations perceived to be either useless or impotent. Everts argues that in wars of survival or in conflicts where success appears evident, people will support government actions.

For Everts, an issue greater than casualty sensitivity is whether modern nation-states, in particular European allies, will sustain any war, regardless of the price or the reason. Using the phrase "the problematique of identity," Everts reasons that the outcome is yet in doubt; populations that have abandoned war as a civilized solution to any problem, regardless of its severity, might not support future wars.

Evert's observations serve a cautionary note for military officers, politicians, and citizens. We are not sure how the global war on terrorism will end, but it is in the realm of possibility that the United States might lose the necessary popular support it needs to win.

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*To every man upon this earth  
Death cometh soon or late;  
And how can man die better  
Than facing fearful odds  
For the ashes of his fathers  
And the temples of his gods?*

—Lays of ancient Rome.  
Horatius, xxvii.